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Previous literature shows that, in many different models, limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of 
the unperturbed game when the sequence of perturbed games converges to the unperturbed one in an 
appropriate sense. The question whether such limit property extends to the equilibrium notions in ambiguous 
games is not yet clear as it seems; in fact, previous literature shows that the extension fails in simple examples. 
The contribution in this paper is to show that the limit property holds for equilibria under ambiguous beliefs 
correspondences (presented by the authors in a previous paper). Key for our result is the sequential convergence 
assumption imposed on the sequence of beliefs correspondences. Counterexamples show why this assumption 
cannot be removed.   
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An important issue in noncooperative game theory is how the set of Nash equilibria changes
when some parameter of the game changes continuously. Even in the simplest models, it can be
shown that if one considers a sequence of perturbed games converging to an unperturbed game
in an appropriate sense, then there might exist an equilibrium x¤ of the unperturbed game such
that there are no sequences of equilibria of the perturbed games converging to x¤. Conversely,
many results have been obtained in the literature showing that limits of equilibria of perturbed
games are, instead, equilibria of the unperturbed game even in general models (see for instance
Fudenberg and Tirole (1993)). This limit property2 has interesting implications; for instance, it
provides a useful theoretical tool for looking at comparative statics e®ects of parameter changes
on Nash predictions; moreover, the classical theory on Nash equilibrium re¯nements builds
upon this kind of result (see for instance van Damme (1989) for an extensive survey). In fact,
re¯nements theory is based on the idea that players make in¯nitesimal errors when playing
their equilibrium strategies and, therefore, re¯ned equilibria are selected as limits of sequences
of equilibria of perturbed games in which perturbations represent the possibility of mistakes.
The quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)) is a generalization of Nash
equilibrium which gives another way to model games with noisy players. The limit property in
this case says that quantal response equilibria converge to Nash equilibria as the error goes to
zero (providing a unique selection of Nash equilibria in generic games). A similar approach has
been considered in Friedmann and Mezzetti (2005) in which random beliefs equilibria have been
investigated. In a random belief equilibrium player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are
randomly drawn from a belief distribution that is dispersed around a central strategy pro¯le
called the focus. It is shown that, as players' beliefs converge to certainty, limits of random
beliefs equilibria are Nash equilibria and therefore provide a (not necessarily unique) selection
of Nash equilibria.
The criticism to the strength of the consistency condition that all players' beliefs are correct
in equilibrium is also the main motivation for many equilibrium notions in which this consistency
condition has been weakeneed by taking into account ambiguous beliefs (see for instance Dow
and Werlang (1994), Lo (1996), Klibano® (1996), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and Marinacci
(2000)). The question whether the limit property extends to equilibria in ambiguous games
has not been clari¯ed yet in the literature. On the one hand, the nature of the de¯nition of
equilibrium makes it reasonable to expect that the extension to ambiguous games holds. On
the other hand, previous literature shows that the extension fails in simple examples. In fact,
Kajii and Ui (2005) consider an interim Bayesian equilibrium notion in a class of incomplete
information games with ambiguous beliefs over the state space and ¯nd out, in a counterexample,
that limits of equilibria of perturbed games are not necessarily equilibria in the unperturbed
game, even if the parameters which describe ambiguity change continuously.
This paper studies the limit property for a notion of equilibrium in ambiguous games called
equilibrium under ambiguous beliefs correspondences (De Marco and Romaniello (2011,b)3). In
our approach, each player's beliefs are given by a correspondence which provides a set of sub-
jective additive beliefs (probability distributions) over outcomes for every strategy pro¯le. Such
beliefs correspondences are exogenous and represent the ability of each player to put restrictions
2The set-valued mapping version of this property is the closed graph property of the Nash Correspondence.
3Many motivating examples can be found in this paper together with existence results. An application to
coalition formation is the subject of De Marco and Romaniello (2011,a).
2on beliefs over outcomes consistently with the strategy pro¯le. In particular, this model em-
bodies ambiguity about beliefs over opponents' strategies and a class of incomplete information
games with multiple priors. In this paper we show that limits of equilibria under perturbed
beliefs correspondences are equilibria under unperturbed beliefs correspondences when the se-
quence of perturbed beliefs correspondences converge to the unperturbed ones in the appropriate
sense. In particular, key for our result is the sequential convergence assumption (Lignola and
Morgan (1992);a,b) imposed on the sequence of beliefs correspondences. Two counterexamples
show why this assumption cannot be removed and provide the intuition why the equilibrium
notion in Kajii and Ui (2005) fails to satisfy the limit property in their counterexample. Fi-
nally, since our equilibrium notion coincides with the classical Nash equilibrium concept when
beliefs are correct, our limit result implies that sequences of equilibria under ambiguous beliefs
correspondences converge to Nash equilibria if ambiguity converges to zero in the appropri-
ate sense. Therefore, this latter remark makes it possible to construct selection mechanisms
for Nash equilibria based on a stability property with respect to ambiguous perturbations of
beliefs.
2 Games, beliefs correspondences and equilibria
We consider a ¯nite set of players I = f1;:::ng; for every player i, ªi = fÃ1
i;:::;Ã
k(i)
i g is the
(¯nite) pure strategy set of player i, ª =
Q
i2I ªi and ª¡i =
Q
j6=i ªj. Denote with Xi the set of





Ãi2ªi xi(Ãi) = 1. Denote also with X =
Qn
j=1 Xj and with X¡i =
Q
j6=i Xj.
Di®erently from the classical literature on games, in this work we do not assume the existence
of a one to one correspondence between strategies and outcomes of a game. Instead, we denote
with ­ µ Rn the set of outcomes of the game, where !i represents the payo® of player i when
outcome ! is realized. Let P be the set of all probability distributions on ­, we consider the
general situation in which each player is endowed with a set-valued map Bi : X Ã P, called
beliefs correspondence, which gives to player i the set Bi(x) of subjective beliefs over outcomes,
for every strategy pro¯le x 2 X. We consider the (extreme) situation in which players are
either pessimistic or optimistic, where a player is pessimistic if, in the presence of ambiguity,
emphasizes the lower payo®s while he is optimistic if he emphasizes the higher ones instead.
More precisely, if we denote with Ei(%) =
P
!2­ %(!)!i, then a pessimistic player has the
pessimistic payo® F P
i : X ! R de¯ned by
F
P
i (x) = min
%2Bi(x)
Ei(%) 8x 2 X; (1)
while an optimistic player has the optimistic payo® F O
i : X ! R de¯ned by
F
O
i (x) = max
%2Bi(x)
Ei(%) 8x 2 X: (2)
Assuming that players are partitioned in optimistic and pessimistic ones, that is, I = O [ P







This game is a classical strategic form game and
3Definition 2.1: A Nash equilibrium of ¡O;P is called equilibrium under beliefs correspondences
Bi with optimistic players O and pessimistic players P.
For the sake of completeness we report the existence result presented in De Marco and
Romaniello (2011). Moreover, it will be clear in the next section that the assumptions imposed
in the existence theorem are not required to prove the limit theorem.
Theorem 2.2: Assume that for every player i, Bi is continuous4 with not empty, compact and
convex images for every x 2 X. If, for every player i 2 O, Bi(¢;x¡i) is concave5 in Xi for every
x¡i 2 X¡i and, for every player i 2 P, Bi(¢;x¡i) is convex in Xi for every x¡i 2 X¡i, then, the
game ¡O;P has at least an equilibrium.
Remark 2.3 (Related concepts): A particular case of beliefs correspondences can be obtained
in the classical framework in which each player i is endowed with a payo® function fi : ª ! R
and a beliefs correspondence from strategy pro¯les to correlated strategies, i.e. Ki : X Ã
¢, where ¢ is the set of probability distributions on ª. In that case, denoting with ­ =
f(f1(Ã);:::;fn(Ã))jÃ 2 ªg the set of outcomes, the beliefs correspondence over outcomes
Bi : X Ã P is de¯ned by
Bi(x) = f% 2 P j9¹ 2 Ki(x)with%(fi (Ã)) = ¹(Ã) 8Ã 2 ªg:
Note that if Ki(x) = x then the game ¡O;P coincides with the mixed extension of ¡ so that the
set of equilibria of ¡O;P coincides with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of ¡.
Finally, in De Marco and Romaniello (2011,b) it is shown that our concept is related to the equi-
librium with uncertainty aversion notion (Klibano® (1996)) whenever the beliefs correspondence
take the following form
Bi(x) = f% 2 P j9p 2 Bi with%(fi (Ã)) = xi(Ãi)p(Ã¡i) 8Ã 2 ªg 8x 2 X: (3)
where Bi is a nonempty, closed and convex subset of probability distributions over ª¡i for every
i = 1;:::;n.
3 The limit theorem
The problem we address in this section is the following: Given the n-tuple of beliefs correspon-
dence (B1;:::;Bn) with corresponding game ¡O;P and a sequence of n-tuples of perturbed beliefs
4Given the set valued map F : Z Ã Y , then (see Aubin and Frankowska (1990))
i) F is lower semicontinuous in z0 if for every y 2 F(z0) and every sequence (zº)º2N converging to z0 there
exists a sequence (yº)º2N converging to y such that yº 2 F(zº) for every º 2 N.
ii) F is upper semicontinuous in z0 if for every open set U such that F(z0) µ U there exists ´ > 0 such that
F(z) µ U for all z 2 BZ(z0;´) = f³ 2 Z j;jj³ ¡ z0jj < ´g.
iv) F is continuous (in the sense of Painlev¶ e-Kuratowski) in z0 if it is lower semicontinuous and upper
semicontinuous in z0.
5Given a convex set Z and a set valued map F : Z Ã Y then
i) F is a said to be concave if tF(z) + (1 ¡ t)F(b z) µ F(tz + (1 ¡ t)b z) 8 z; b z 2 Z; 8 t 2 [0;1]
ii) F is a said to be convex if F(tz + (1 ¡ t)b z) µ tF(z) + (1 ¡ t)F(b z) 8 z;b z 2 Z; 8 t 2 [0;1]:
4correspondences (B1;º;:::;Bn;º)º2N with corresponding sequence of perturbed games (¡O;P
º )º2N;
we look for conditions of convergence of the sequence of perturbed beliefs correspondences to the
beliefs correspondences of ¡O;P which guarantee that converging sequences of equilibria of the
perturbed games have their limits in the set of equilibria of the unperturbed game. This problem
looks especially interesting in the particular case in which the unperturbed game corresponds to
a classical game with no ambiguity. In fact, the question in this case is to understand whether
sequences of equilibria under ambiguous beliefs correspondences converge to Nash equilibria if
ambiguity converges to zero in an appropriate sense.
Theorem 3.1: Given the n-tuple of beliefs correspondence (B1;:::;Bn) and the corresponding
game ¡O;P. Assume that,
i) For every player i (Bi;º)º2N is a sequence of correspondences, with Bi;º : X Ã P for every
º 2 N, which is sequentially convergent to Bi, that is, for every x 2 X and every sequence
(xº)º2N converging to x,
Limsup
º!1






Bi;º(xº) = f% 2 P j 8" > 0 9º s:t: forº ¸ º S(%;") \ Bi;º(xº) 6= ;g;
Limsup
º!1
Bi;º(xº) = f% 2 P j 8" > 0 8º 2 N 9º ¸ º s:t: S(%;") \ Bi;º(xº) 6= ;g:
and S(%;") is the ball in Rj­j with center % and radius ".
ii) The sequence (x¤
º)º2N ½ X converges to x¤ 2 X and, for every º 2 N, x¤
º is an equilibrium
of the game ¡O;P
º corresponding to the n-tuple of beliefs correspondences (B1;º;:::;Bn;º).
Then, x¤ is an equilibrium of the game ¡O;P.
Proof. For every º 2 N, let F O
i;º and F P
i;º be the payo®s for the optimistic and pessimistic player i
in the game ¡O;P
º corresponding to the n-tuple of beliefs correspondences (B1;º;:::;Bn;º). First,
we prove that for a ¯xed player i the sequences (F O
i;º)º2N and (F P
i;º)º2N continuously converge
respectively to F O
i and F P
i , that is, for every x 2 X and every sequence (xº)º2N converging
to x it holds that limº!1 F O
i;º(xº) = F O
i (x) and limº!1 F P
i;º(xº) = F P
i (x). In fact, for every
º there exist %º and b %º in Bi;º(xº) such that Ei(%º) = F O
i;º(xº) and Ei(b %º) = F P
i;º(xº). By
assumption, the sequence (Bi;º)º2N is sequential upper convergent; that is, for every x 2 X and




Then, for every converging subsequence (%k)k2N ½ (%º)º2N with %k ! % and for every converging
subsequence (b %k)k2N ½ (b %º)º2N with b %k ! b %, the limits % and b % belong to Bi(x). This implies
that Ei(%) ¸ F P








i (x) and F
P





5Conversely, let % and b % be elements of Bi(x) such that Ei(%) = F P
i (x) and Ei(b %) = F O
i (x). By
assumption, the sequence (Bi;º)º2N is sequential lower convergent; that is, for every x 2 X and




Then, there exist sequences (%º)º2N with %º ! % and (b %º)º2N with b %º ! b %, such that %º and b %º
in Bi;º(xº) for all º 2 N. Since Ei(%º) ¸ F P
i;º(xº) and Ei(b %º) · F O
i;º(xº) for all º 2 N. Hence
F
P










i (x) = liminf
º!1
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which ¯nally implies that the sequences (F O
i;º)º2N and (F P
i;º)º2N continuously converge respec-
tively to F O
i and F P
i .
Now, let (x¤
º)º2N ½ X be a sequence converging to x¤ 2 X such that, for every º 2 N,
x¤
º is an equilibrium of the game ¡O;P
º corresponding to the n-tuple of beliefs correspondences
















































which implies that x¤
i is a best reply to x¤
¡i. Since analogous arguments hold for pessimistic
players we get the assertion.
Remark 3.2: As it will be clari¯ed in the counterexamples in the next section, the sequential
convergence assumption (4) is crucial to obtain the limit theorem. This property (namely the
upper and lower sequential convergence properties) have been previously de¯ned and used to
obtain epicontinuity of marginal functions in Lignola and Morgan (1992,a) and convergence for
minsup problems in Lignola and Morgan (1992,b). Finally, Theorem 5.44 in Rockafellar and
Wets (1998) shows that the convergence assumption (4) (therein called continuous convergence
of set-valued maps) di®ers from the convergence (in the sense of Painlev¶ e-Kuratowski) of the
graphs of the correspondences (graphical convergence).
Remark 3.3: If the beliefs correspondences over outcomes are built upon beliefs correspon-
dences over the set of pure strategy pro¯les as illustrated in remark 2.3, then our limit result
implies that sequences of equilibria under ambiguous beliefs correspondences converge to Nash
equilibria of the game without ambiguity, whenever the sequences of perturbed beliefs corre-
spondences sequentially converge to the identity mappings. Therefore, it could be possible to
construct selection mechanisms for Nash equilibria based on a stability property with respect
to ambiguous perturbations on beliefs.
64 Two counterexamples
In this section we give two examples showing that the limit property of the equilibria fails by
removing from the hypothesis of the previous theorem only the sequential upper convergence
assumption or only the sequential lower convergence assumption. The ¯rst example is just a
reformulation of the original counterexample given in Kajii and Ui (2005) while, the second
example is slight variation of the ¯rst one.
4.1 Example 1
This example is substantially the one presented in Kajii and Ui (2005). Consider the following







Game 1 Game 2
Fix " 2 [0;1], assume that the prior probability that player 1 assigns to Game 1 is a function
of " given by
P1(") = " 8" 2 [0;1];
while, the prior probability that player 1 assigns to Game 1 is ambiguous6 and given by a







P2(") = 0 if " = 0










We denote the mixed strategies as follows: x1 = prob(a1), 1¡x1 = prob(b1), x2 = prob(a2) and
1¡x2 = prob(b2). Therefore, with an abuse of notation, (x1;x2) identi¯es a strategy pro¯le for
every x1 2 [0;1] and x2 2 [0;1].
Consider the case of a pessimistic player 2. In this case the payo® of player 2 for a given







x2(1 ¡ 3P2(")) = ¡2x2
Hence, best reply of player 2 is always x2 = 0 regardless of player 1 strategy. This implies that
the set of equilibria with a pessimistic player 2 is given by NP(") = f(b1;b2)g = f(0;0)g: For
" = 0, the game coincides with Game 2 and therefore NP(0) = f(a1;a2)g = f(1;1)g. Hence, for
6Kajii and Ui (2005) consider an interim Bayesian equilibrium notion in a class of incomplete information
games with ambiguous beliefs over the state space. What here we call priors, in their counterexample are indeed
posteriors coming from the observation of a signal and from the choice of the full Bayesian updating rule for
multiple priors.
7every sequence "º ! 0, the corresponding sequences of equilibria do not converge to the unique
equilibrium in NP(0).
The failure of the limit property in this example depends on a lack of sequential upper
convergence of the sequence of beliefs correspondences of player 2. In fact, being the three
possible outcomes ¡2; 1 and 0 and denoted respectively with p1;p2;p3 their probabilities, the









; p2 = x2 ¡ p1; p3 = 1 ¡ x2
¾
while
B2;0(x1;x2) = f(p1;p2;p3)jp1 = 0; p2 = x2; p3 = 1 ¡ x2g
Hence, for every sequence "º & 0 and every sequence (x1;º;x2;º) ! (x1;x2) it follows that
Limsup
º!1
B2;"º(x1;º;x2;º) = f(p1;p2;p3)jp1 2 [0;x2]; p2 = x2 ¡ p1; p3 = 1 ¡ x2g










for every sequence (x1;º;x2;º) ! (x1;x2) it follows that the sequence of (B2;"º)º is sequential
lower convergent to B2;0
4.2 Example 2
Consider the game in the previous example in which the prior probability that player 1 assigns
to Game 1 is still given by
P1(") = " 8" 2 [0;1]
while the prior probability that player 2 assigns to Game 1 is still ambiguous but it is given by
the new correspondence de¯ned by
½
P2(") = " if " 2]0;1]








" > 0 " = 0 and P2(") 2 [0;1]





x2(1 ¡ 3P2(0)) = ¡2x2:
Hence, best reply of player 2 is always x2 = 0 regardless of player 1 strategy. This implies that
the set of equilibria with a pessimistic player 2 is given by NP(0) = f(b1;b2)g = f(0;0)g:
Denote with
N1 = f(1;x2 j x2 2 [1=2;1])g; N2 = f(x1;1=2)j x1 2 [0;1])g; N3 = f(0;x2)j x2 2 [0;1=2])g:
Since for " 2]0;1] the set of equilibria NP(" obviously coincides with the set of classical Nash







f(0;0)g if " 2]1=3;1]
N1 [ N2 [ N3 if " = 1=3
f(1;1)g if " 2]0;1=3;1[
f(0;0)g if " = 0
Hence, for every sequence "º ! 0, the corresponding sequences of equilibria do not converge to
the unique equilibrium in NP(0).
The failure of the limit property in this case depends instead on a lack of sequential lower
convergence of the sequence of beliefs correspondences of player 2. In fact, being the three
possible outcomes ¡2; 1 and 0 and denoted respectively with p1;p2;p3 their probabilities, the
beliefs correspondence for a given " = 0 is
B2;0(x1;x2) = f(p1;p2;p3)jp1 2 [0;x2]; p2 = x2 ¡ p1; p3 = 1 ¡ x2g
while
B2;"(x1;x2) = f(p1;p2;p3)jp1 = "x2; p2 = x2 ¡ p1; p3 = 1 ¡ x2g 8" 2]0;1]
Hence, for every sequence "º & 0 and every sequence (x1;º;x2;º) ! (x1;x2) it follows that
Liminf
º!1
B2;"º(x1;º;x2;º) = f(p1;p2;p3)jp1 = 0; p2 = x2; p3 = 1 ¡ x2g










for every sequence (x1;º;x2;º) ! (x1;x2) it follows that the sequence of (B2;"º)º is sequential
upper convergent to B2;0.
9References
[1] Aubin J.P. and H. Frankowska (1990): Set Valued Analysis, Birkhauser: Boston.
[2] De Marco G. and M. Romaniello (2011,a): A Dynamic Game of Coalition Formation under Umbiguity,
Soft Computing, 15(4), 637-644.
[3] De Marco G. and M. Romaniello (2011,b): Beliefs Correspondences and Equilibria in Ambiguous Games,
International Journal of Intelligent Systems, forthcoming.
Working paper available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30800/.
[4] Dow, J. and Werlang, S.R.C. (1994) Nash Equilibrium under Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward
Induction, Journal of Economic Theory, 64, 305-324.
[5] Eichberger, J. and Kelsey, D. (2000) Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria, Games and Economic
Behavior, 30, 183-215.
[6] Friedman J W. and C. Mezzetti (2005): Random Belief Equilibrium in Normal Form Games, Games and
Economic Behavior, 51, 296-323.
[7] Fudenberg D. and J. Tirole (1993): Game Theory, MIT Press: Boston.
[8] Kajii A. and T. Ui (2005): Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors, Japanese Economic
Review, 56(3), 332-351.
[9] Klibano® P. (1996): Uncertainty, Decision, and Normal Form Games, working paper.
[10] Lignola M.B. and J. Morgan (1992): Convergences of Marginal Functions with Dependent Constraints,
Optimization, 23, 189-213.
[11] Lignola M.B. and J. Morgan (1992): Existence and Approximation Results for Minsup Problems, in G.
Feichtinger, W. Buhler, F. Radermacher, and P. Stahly eds., Proceedings of The International Conference
on Operation Research, 90, Springer Verlag, Vienna, 157-164.
[12] Lo, K.C. (1996) Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 443-484.
[13] Marinacci M. (2000): Ambiguous Games, Games and Economic Behavior 31, 191-219.
[14] McKelvey R.D. and T.R. Palfrey (1995): Quantal Response Equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior
10, 6-38.
[15] Rockafellar R.T. and J.-B. Wets (1998): Variational Analysis, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
[16] van Damme E. (1989): Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
10